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Many myths are part of our lives, past and present, and we hardly notice most of 
them. Paul A. Hanebrink of Rutgers University set out to examine a relatively new 
historical myth, which, however, has been a force to reckon with ever since it was 
created: Judeo-Bolshevism. The gist of this myth that was born in the beginning 
of the twentieth century is that Communism was basically a Jewish conspiracy in 
order to achieve hegemony in the world, “a transhistorical global conspiracy by 
Jews to destroy Western civilization.” (4) It is no coincidence that the idea first 
reared its head during World War I. Anti-Semitism had had a long history in 
Europe, when in 1917, in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, a new 
state ideology appeared on the scene, which denied practically everything that 
had accumulated in European and North American societies and culture: property 
rights, individual freedom, religion, etc. Therefore, with the cataclysmic changes 
during and right after the war, it was relatively easy to make large masses of people 
believe, both in Europe and the United States, that the root of the trouble was 
the Jewish communists. And it is enough to think of the events in Hungary or 
Germany in 1919 to appreciate the magnitude of this question. In the twenty-first 
century, when due to complex issues nationalism has been on the rise once more, 
many appear to have found an answer in the familiar vein: anti-Semitism and the 
accusation of Judeo-Bolshevism. What is more, this new trend is not only palpable 
in Central and Eastern Europe, where for historical reasons this might be less 
surprising; these voices can be heard in Western Europe and on the far right in the 
United States as well.
Hanebrink goes through some periods of the twentieth century and examines 
in the historical mirror the accusations—imagined or real—of a Judeo-Bolshevist 
agenda. The inevitable starting point is 1919, when shortly after the seismic shift 
caused by the Russian Bolsheviks, in the chaos brought on by the end of the world 
war, in Central Europe—in Germany and Hungary—revolutions appeared in 
short succession. It is true that many Jewish persons were attracted to the radical 
ideology and movements, but the reason for this lay in the fact that most of them 
did not get the chance to fully assimilate in their respective countries. There 
was political fragmentation among the Jewish people as well, but their presence 
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was acutely felt in far left organizations everywhere—sometimes making up the 
majority. Therefore, those Jews who openly and loudly were disseminating the 
tenets of Bolshevik ideology made it possible that the Jewry as one could be 
made the scapegoat for the social pandemonium. The author identifies three anti-
Semitic beliefs that had been around for centuries: striving for social disharmony, 
international Jewish conspiracy to the detriment of Christians, and Jewish 
fanaticism. The revolutionary period, naturally, only heightened and strengthened 
these fears, and gave a wide enough basis for large multitudes of people to believe 
in Judeo-Bolshevism as the modern-day equivalent of the Jewish danger. 
When the revolutions in East and Central Europe, suitably to their nature, led 
to excesses and a reign of terror, (imagined) “reality” justified fear that Jews and 
Bolsheviks wanted to overtake the control in various countries and they were not 
circumspect as to their means. This fear was married to the old European historical 
reflex that physical danger is manifested in the shape of barbaric hordes coming 
from the East—bringing alien and primitive culture with them. The Mongols and 
later the Turks were the par excellence examples, and Europe had to be defended 
against their incursion and devastation. This strain of thinking was especially strong 
in Polish and Hungarian historical mythology. Although it must not be forgotten 
that when the first tribes of Hungarians appeared in the Carpathian Basin and 
raided the land west to them, they were judged by the same standard as later Batu 
Khan’s hordes or the Turkish Sultans’ armies. “The Bolshevik,” writes the author, 
“was at once a rootless migrant Jew, the sign of an invading horde from the East, 
and an Asiatic beast.” (41) Twentieth-century communist “danger” was similarly 
perceived by many, and Europe, but especially Central and Eastern Europe, in 
the wake of the losses in World War I and social uproar, appears to have found 
the new source of peril in Judeo-Bolshevism. This danger seemed to threaten the 
whole European order and civilization. Since the fanaticism and messianism of the 
Jews was well known, fear grew into hysteric proportion at times and places that 
their country would be ruled by revolution—and the Christian world might be 
conquered.
Before World War I, in the area of Eastern Europe where Jews were concentrated 
in larger numbers—Poland, Russia, Ukraine—pogroms regularly took place. As 
a result, tens of thousands of poor Jewish people began to move westward. They 
were the Galician Jews who arrived in Budapest and Vienna, among other places, 
where they were not welcome, and they were often found to be the scapegoats for 
shortages of all kinds when war arrived. With the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, 
the hatred toward the Jews collectively only gained strength when, on account 
of the Jewish political actors, the “revolutionary-subversive” label was extended 
generally to the Jewry. With the armistice in November 1918, fights did not cease 
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in Central and Eastern Europe—civil wars and revolutions were a typical feature in 
the region. Hanebrink introduces the Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian examples 
in order to give an extensive picture of the anti-Judeo-Bolshevist sentiment and 
steps taken against that perceived danger. All these countries wanted to create a 
pure nation state, and they propagated this wish at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Naturally, Jews were not deemed as part of that national image. It seemed good 
political capital for all the newly formed states to make the Jewish communists 
appear as a transnational phenomenon to be feared not only by them but by the 
Western countries. If this danger was not stopped, so the argument went, the 
revolutionary wave led by Jews might sweep Western Europe as well. The Peace 
Conference in the end heeded the call and decided that there was a need to stem 
the Bolshevik tide. At the same time, minority protection in the peace treaties 
was an important new feature that was supposed to protect Jewish people as well, 
although the League of Nations, responsible to carry out such measures, came up 
way too short in this dimension—as in others. So, Jewish communities accused of 
incendiary activity remained the scapegoats, non-nationals, and dangerous, all this 
giving the basis to cut back on their rights. It is enough to think of the Numerus 
Clausus of 1920, the Hungarian law that discriminated against Jews mainly in 
higher education. 
The second chapter of the book focuses on Germany under the Hitler era, and 
the increasing measures against the Jewish-Bolshevik enemy. As the author puts it, 
in Germany “Judeo-Bolshevism became a symbol of the need to wage a ruthless 
war of preemptive defense against racialized threats to national security.” (92) The 
Spanish Civil War gave a perfect opportunity for Hitler to widen his vision to 
much of the European continent. Since he was already seen as a successful person 
against the imagined Judeo-Bolshevik danger, he easily became the credited leader 
of this fight internationally too. The Catholic Church called attention to the peril 
caused by both Communism and Nazism, but its own anti-Semitism before and 
during World War II proved to be a hindrance in case of the latter, and only in the 
postwar years did it start to speak out clearly against the totalitarian state form.
Naturally, the most tangible and brutal effort against the Judeo-Bolshevik peril 
was the German assault on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. Although the 
propaganda of ideology masked geopolitical goals, still it was by far the harshest 
manifestation of anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism of the past decades. At the 
same time, however, the old lurking fear of Asiatic hordes could be detected in 
most European countries that shared the belief that there was danger in the East, 
and this danger might be uprooted by the German preemptive strike. The Nazi 
atrocities on Soviet territory—practically genocide—were in close harmony with 
and a direct antecedent to the “final solution” to exterminate the Jews. But it was 
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not only the Germans. On the territories under Soviet control in Poland in 1939-
41, there were undoubtedly many cruelties carried out—and the Nazi propaganda 
did everything to tout them as to give some justification for the offensive in the 
East—, and almost everywhere among the “liberated” local population collective 
anti-Semitism burst open. The Germans allowed this type of safety valve to work: 
trying to turn the pent-up hatred against the Jews and Bolsheviks into a type of 
crusade. Then, as the Soviet Red Army began its counteroffensive and it became 
clear that Eastern Europe would belong to the Soviet sphere of influence, the anti-
Jewish and anti-communist sentiment reached its zenith, and never disappeared.
With Eastern Europe becoming a Soviet zone after World War II, in certain 
countries the stereotype concerning Judeo-Bolshevism remained. Right after the 
conclusion of the most horrific war in human history, in Poland, Romania, and 
Hungary the well-known defensive reflexes were back at work. As a result, the 
overwhelming majority of the people in these countries considered the Soviet 
occupation—which was called “liberation” in the official propaganda—and the 
Moscow-centered rule of the local communist parties as the latest chapter of the 
Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy. According to Hanebrink, this had three pillars: the 
behavior of the Soviet occupying troops, the reappearance of Jews—both physical 
and political, and the emergence of the earlier persecuted and banned communist 
parties via the effective help of the Soviet troops. And since again there were a 
few conspicuous Jewish leaders in these communist parties, the generalization and 
earlier acquired instincts gave potent basis for many to give credit for the Jewish-
Communist cooperation and their aim to rule the world. In the “us vs. them” 
dichotomy the Jewish population in these countries more often than not fell in the 
“them” category, “in ways that mapped neatly onto popular understandings of the 
new Soviet-backed state as a foreign power: ‘them’.” (175). After the establishment 
of the state of Israel in 1948, and when it became real that the new country enjoys 
American backing, there was a wave of nationalist communism in the satellite 
countries, which had again negative results for the Jewish citizens. They were once 
more targeted as aliens, and people perceived a Zionist conspiracy by the help of 
which the Jews wanted to grab control—to the disadvantage of their respective 
countries. Basically, the politics of memory was at stake, in which the Holocaust 
was committed by the Nazis and their collaborators, while liberation was thanked 
to the Soviets who worked together with the national antifascist elements. In this 
type of narrative there was little room for the Jews. 
Another chapter concentrates on the processes regarding the central theme 
of the book—this time in West Germany, which was established in 1949. The 
larger, western part of Germany was under American, or Allied, control in the 
first years after the Second World War. In the changed political climate and under 
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the American-sponsored denazification program there could be no promoting 
the known elements of the propaganda for a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy. The 
emphasis quickly, and with the setting in of the Cold War totally, shifted only to 
anti-communism. In this work, many former Nazis participated under American 
protection, because the experience and “changed” worldview of such people could 
be used by the United States. This somewhat new conservative Christian approach 
also appeared in Austria and basically everywhere in the western part of Europe: an 
ecumenical Christian (Democratic) Europe had to defend itself against the Asiatic 
communist ideology that denied the existence of God and tried to make the life 
of the Church close to impossible in its sphere. In addition, there was the fear of 
the totalitarian state that could feed on the memory of not-so-distant fascism and 
Nazism. That is how the Judeo-Christian idea came into being in the first half 
of the Cold War, which served as perhaps one of the most important theoretical 
theses of liberal democracy against the Soviet bloc.
The book’s final chapter examines the thirty years since the end of the Soviet 
Union and communism in Eastern Europe. Its central theme is how the memory 
of the Holocaust became relative. This was done in many post-socialist countries 
by elevating the victims of the communist era onto the same level as the millions 
of Jews murdered by the Nazis. This almost automatically meant that often the 
Jews appeared as scapegoats for crimes in the 1945-1990 period. “Amid debates 
about how to strike the right balance between acknowledging the genocide of 
Europe’s Jews and recalling other kinds of suffering—above all, suffering caused by 
the crimes of Communist regimes—the demands of Holocaust memory”, writes 
Hanebrink, “were frequently juxtaposed with another form of collective memory: 
national memory.” (259) Such debate, if not meaningless, is unnecessary. Both 
systems—Nazism and Communism—had left millions of people dead in their 
wake. The author implicates that the relative comparison between the two tragic 
state forms sprang from the latent, or sometimes quite open, anti-Semitism that 
could not tolerate that “only” Jews should be remembered as victims. Naturally, 
this type of politics of memory at the same time wants to alleviate the perhaps 
existing pangs of collective conscience that stems from the role of an accomplice in 
the systematic extermination of the Jews in these countries. 
And the phenomenon has not disappeared without a trace in the present 
century. In his conclusion Hanebrink states—having in mind the mostly negative 
reactions to the immigrant and refugee wave coming to Europe from the Middle 
East and beyond—that “examining the ideological function that the idea of Judeo-
Bolshevism has played in European politics since the end of World War I reveals 
that this myth—a potent fusion of racism and ideological defensiveness—is one of 
the most fertile sources for anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment today.” (277)
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There are minor mistakes in the book. For instance, the author misses the 
German attack against France in World War II by a month, or the Hungarian 
foreign minister, Kálmán Kánya, appears as the prime minister of the country. (122, 
131) This, at the same time, only indicates how difficult it is to write a monograph 
that encompasses a long period and many countries in Europe. Despite such 
minor shortcomings, the exhaustive research and rich source material, the logical 
argument and contextualization, the examination of certain basic connections all 
make Hanebrink’s work a worthy piece of modern historiography.
